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In 1985, in the midst of the highest levels of hyperinﬂation ever recorded in the history of the
Bolivian economy, President Victor Paz Estenssoro proclaimed that the country was in its
death throes and that it could survive only by exporting more of its production. Thus, the
phrase “export or die” was coined. As part of the reform package –whose cornerstone was to
reduce inﬂation and introduce macroeconomic stability– an export promotion agency (EPA)
was created (INPEX).
Bolivia’s search for development through exports is not exceptional. The ﬁrst EPA –
still existing– was created in 1919 in Finland, and in the mid-1960s they became a popular
instrument to boost exports and reduce trade deﬁcits, under the auspices of the International
Trade Center (a joint UNCTAD-GATT multilateral organization). By the early 1990s their
eﬃciency began to be questioned (Keesing and Singer, 1991 and 1991a). EPAs in developing
countries were criticized for lacking strong leadership, being inadequately funded, hiring staﬀ
which was bureaucratic and not client oriented, and suﬀering from government involvement.1
As a result, many development institutions withdrew their support to EPAs.2 Part of the
blame for the failure of the early EPAs was put on the import substituting trade regimes
that prevailed at the time. Overcoming such a strong anti-trade bias was probably too much
to ask of any specialized agency. However, more than a decade later, the trade environment
has signiﬁcantly changed in the developing world and some EPAs under the auspices of the
ITC have evolved in the direction suggested by Hogan, Keesing and Singer (1991) in their
inﬂuential piece.3 The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of the impact of
today’s EPAs on national exports.
The objective of EPAs is to help (potential) exporters ﬁnd markets for their products, as
1Similar critiques emerged for EPAs in developed countries; see for example Kotabe and Czinkota (1992)
study of the United States sub-national EPAs.
2Of the 73 export promotion agencies in developing countries surveyed for this paper only 21 had some
budgetary support from multilateral donors in 2005, and in only 11 agencies the budgetary support from
multilateral donors represented more than 25 percent of the total budget. In the case of one Sub-Saharan
Africa agency more than 75 percent of its budget in 2005 came from multilateral donors.
3That is there is more private sector involvement, larger funding, and a stronger organization and leadership.
1well as provide them with a better understanding of products demanded in diﬀerent export
markets. One can divide the services oﬀered by EPAs into four broad categories: 1) country
image building (advertising, promotional events, but also advocacy); 2) export support services
(exporter training, technical assistance, capacity building, including regulatory compliance,
information on trade ﬁnance, logistics, customs, packaging, pricing); 3) marketing (trade fairs,
exporter and importer missions, follow-up services oﬀered by representatives abroad); and 4)
market research and publications (general, sector, and ﬁrm level information, such as market
surveys, on-line information on export markets, publications encouraging ﬁrms to export,
importer and exporter contact databases).
The economic justiﬁcation for government involvement in export promotion is based on the
theory of asymmetric information and other market failures. There are important externalities
associated with the gathering of foreign market information related to consumer preferences,
business opportunities, quality and technical requirements, etc. Private ﬁrms alone will not
provide foreign market information, as companies hesitate to incur research and marketing
costs that can also beneﬁt competitors. The same applies to pioneer exporters, who make a
considerable investment in attempts to open foreign markets, cultivating contacts, establish
distribution chains and other costly activities that can be used by their rivals (Hausmann and
Rodrik, 2003). Higher uncertainty associated with trading across borders in markets with
diﬀerent legislation have also been put forward as a justiﬁcation for export insurance schemes
supported by the public sector.4
From an economic perspective the argument for public funding of EPAs needs to be based
on an assessment of the social costs and beneﬁts associated with the activities of the EPA.
Social beneﬁts are likely to be larger than the social costs if there are large positive externalities
associated with higher current exports across ﬁrms, sectors or time and within the exporting
country.5
4See Greenaway and Kneller (2005) for a recent survey of the literature on trade and externalities. For a
more skpetic view, see Panagariya (2000).
5Note that some of these externalities may travel across borders. It is clear that some of the beneﬁts from
export promotion activities can be captured by consumers in the importing country for whom search costs are
reduced. This undermines the case for national government funding of export promotion programs and calls
2It should be clear that program evaluation of EPAs on economic welfare grounds is diﬃcult
if not impossible. Thus often –if not always– evaluations of EPAs stop short of an assessment
based on welfare grounds, and focus on the more modest objective of assessing whether exports
have increased or whether new markets have been opened. This paper is no exception. Our
goal is twofold: ﬁrst to determine whether EPAs are having an impact on exports; and second,
to identify the activities and institutional structures of agencies that seem to have positive
eﬀects on exports.
In order to answer these questions we undertook a world survey of national EPAs to gather
information on their objectives, activities and institutional structure. To answer the questions
of what works and what does not work, we then try to econometrically identify the impact
on exports of diﬀerent institutional structures, objectives and activities.
The resulting evidence suggests that on average EPAs have a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact on national exports. There is heterogeneity across levels of development, as
the eﬃciency of EPA monotonically increases with GDP per capita. There is also heterogeneity
across regions: larger impacts are found in Eastern Europe and Asia, Latin America, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, with agencies in the Middle East and North Africa lagging behind.
There is also evidence that there are important decreasing returns to scale in resources
devoted to export promotion, and even negative marginal returns for budgets above a certain
level (estimated at $ 1 per capita). Thus, as far as EPAs are concerned, small is beautiful.
In terms of what type of institutional arrangements, objectives and activities lead to a
stronger impact on exports our results suggest the following. EPAs should have a large share
of the executive board in the hands of the private sector, but a large share of their budget
should be publicly funded. The proliferation of small agencies within a country leads to
an overall less eﬀective program. EPAs are more eﬀective when focusing on non-traditional
exports, or have some broad sector focus (e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, high-tech,
etc...). They should also focus their activities on large ﬁrms (which can take advantage of
EPAs services), but which are not yet exporters. The use of oﬃce representation abroad
for multilateral interventions.
3has a positive impact on exports in the full sample, but a negative impact in a sub-sample of
developing countries, suggesting that in poorer countries EPAs eﬀorts should focus on on-shore
activities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
export promotion. Section 3 describes our global survey of EPAs and provides some descriptive
statistics to help understand the objectives, activities, and institutional structures that exist
in EPAs around the world. Section 4 describes the econometric strategy. Section 5 provides
the empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
2 EPAs: What do we know so far?
As far as we are aware, there has been no cross-country statistical analysis of the impact of
EPAs on exports. The exception is perhaps Rose (2007), who estimates the impact that the
presence of an embassy or consulate may have on bilateral trade using a gravity model. Rose
argues that as communication costs fall, foreign embassies and consulates have lost much
of their role in decision-making and information-gathering, and therefore are increasingly
marketing themselves as agents of export promotion. In a sample of twenty-two exporting
countries –of which eight are developing countries– and around 200 potential trading partners
he ﬁnds that for each additional consulate abroad, exports increase by 6 to 10 percent.
The bulk of the empirical literature that has looked more closely at the eﬀectiveness of
export promotion has focused on agencies in developed countries, particularly the United
States. There have been two broad approaches. One relies on surveys of random samples of
exporters and potential exporters, asking which programs they have made use of, their opinions
of these programs, and the success they have had in exporting. Kedia and Chhokar (1986),
for example, found that export promotion programs in the United States have little impact,
largely because of a lack of awareness of their programs. Seringhaus and Botschen (1991)
surveyed the opinion of nearly 600 ﬁrms in both Canada and Austria, and found that export
promotion service use was low, and the programs were not addressing the needs of exporters.
4Gencturk and Kotabe (2001) tested the link between program usage and export performance
in a sample of 162 US ﬁrms, and found that usage of export programs increased proﬁtability,
but not sales, which suggests that there were no externalities across ﬁrms, and that export
programs represented a mere transfer from agencies to the exporting ﬁrm. Gencturk and
Kotabe also found that experienced exporters beneﬁted from government programs in terms
of proﬁtability more than new exporters. Despite their criticism of existing programs, these
studies do support the argument, however, that EPAs are a response to a genuine need of
small and medium-sized ﬁrms, and that they can be crucial for export success.6
In the late 1980s, the World Bank undertook an assessment of existing EPAs in the de-
veloping world (Hogan, Keesing and Singer, 1991). The report argued that a consensus had
emerged with a strong negative view of EPAs in developing countries. In a series of inﬂuential
studies (Keesing and Singer, 1991, 1991a) the authors argued that EPAs had failed to achieve
their goals and in many instances had had a negative impact, except in those countries that
already had favorable policies vis-` a-vis exports, namely Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and
Taiwan (Keesing, 1993). A series of weaknesses were noted: EPAs were staﬀed with poorly
trained civil servants who were out of touch with their clients in the private sector; these
public sector organizations did not provide the incentives to ensure a high-quality service to
exporters; agencies failed to address the major supply constraints on exporters, which were
often not marketing-related, particularly in environments where import substitution policies
prevailed.
Others (Hogan, 1991, de Wulf, 2001) argued that the key problem with EPAs was their lack
of funding and that bad policy environments could be overcome by well funded EPAs, as the
examples of Korea, China and Taiwan - contrary to Keesing’s argument - in fact demonstrated.
Hogan also argued that the one-size ﬁts all solution often advocated by donors was ill-suited,
and diﬀerent environments required diﬀerent structures.
6Czinkota (2002) argues that governments should lead eﬀorts to help ﬁrms appreciate that they are ready
for export or learn what they need to do to get ready. Many executives do not initiate export activities
because of their uncertainty about new factors such as variable currency exchange rates, greater distances,
new government regulations, new legal and ﬁnancial systems, etc. The government is well positioned to help
ﬁrms overcome such information failures.
5In spite of the strong criticisms, EPAs were not abandoned. Indeed, the number of publicly
funded agencies increased over the course of the 1990s. More recently, the development litera-
ture has taken a slightly more positive view of the potential role of export promotion agencies
in poor countries. The rationale underlying the criticisms of Keesing and Singer (1991, 1991a)
was that the early failures of EPAs were mainly due to import substitution policies that made
the job of EPAs very diﬃcult. In the 1990s, that strong bias against exports vanished, and
prominent development economists have adopted a more benign view of EPAs. For example,
in a study of how governments can promote non-traditional exports in Africa, one of the main
recommendations of G.K.Helleiner –who led the study– was to create an adequately funded
EPA to help exporters overcome the costs and risks of entering unfamiliar and demanding
international markets (Helleiner, 2002).
In terms of what type of program, institutional set-up, and ﬁnancing is more likely to suc-
ceed, Alvarez (2004) provided evidence from a survey of 295 small-and-medium-sized sporadic
and permanent exporters in Chile. While trade shows and trade missions did not aﬀect the
probability of being a successful exporter, a program of exporter committees showed a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant impact. Such committees are composed of a group of ﬁrms with common
objectives in international business, which cooperate on research, marketing and promotion.
Macario (2000) identiﬁed the policies that determine successes and failures in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico. On the basis of interviews with successful exporters, she sets out
various recommendations for export promotion agencies: they should be directed at ﬁrms
with new products or who are entering new markets; they should emphasize cost-sharing to
ensure that programs are used only by those truly dedicated to export; support should be
given for a maximum of 2-3 years so that it does not turn into a subsidy; programs should be
submitted to external evaluation; agencies work best when they are subject to a mix of public
and private management.
The conclusion about private management is shared by the ITC (see for example ITC,
2000), and by much of the early literature (Keesing and Singer, 1991a 1991b, de Wulf, 2001).7
7The ITC also provides constantly updated information about best practices and advice on export promo-
tion strategies (see http://www.intracen.org/instasptp), and their annual conferences are an useful tool for
6However, the view that the focus should be on new products and entering new markets is not
shared by everyone. Indeed, ITC (1998) or Boston Consulting (2004) suggest that it is most
useful to target ﬁrms that are “threshold” or “mature” exporters, as inappropriate targeting
at the ﬁrm level can be wasteful.
In his survey of the early literature, de Wulf (2001) stressed the importance of emphasizing
on-shore activities. EPAs have traditionally focused on oﬀ-shore activities, such as information
gathering, trade fairs and trade representation, sometimes neglecting the importance of home
country supply conditions.
Our global survey of EPAs sheds light on some of the old and current debates. As noted
by Hogan (2001), heterogeneity of environment, structures, policies and their impact are an
important concern that we will try to seriously address. Nonetheless, cross-country analysis in-
herently limit the extent to which the heterogeneity of impacts can be addressed.8 Ultimately,
this type of exercise must be complemented with country-speciﬁc case studies.
3 Survey of EPAs: Summary statistics
During the summer and fall of 2005 we conducted an eighteen question survey of EPAs around
the world.9 Through the ITC website (www.intracen.org/tpo) we obtained a database with
contact information. We complemented this list with the help of many World Bank country
economists who provided contact information for national EPAs. We contacted agencies or
Ministries in 147 countries. In 31 countries we were informed that there was no national
EPA. The surveys was sent to 116 countries and 92 answered (of which 4 responded that they
could not respond). Each of the 88 surveys that we received was followed up with phone
conversations to conﬁrm and clarify some of the answers. The list of 88 agencies appears in
the Appendix Table. All countries in the sample are classiﬁed by geographic regions.
The survey contains ﬁve parts: i) institutional structure, ii) responsibilities of the agency,
agencies from diﬀerent part of the world to compare strategies.
8Although we do test for the existence of heterogeneity across countries, if fully addressed one is likely to
run out of degrees of freedom.
9The survey is available from the authors upon request.
7iii) the strategies followed, iv) resources and expenditures, and v) activities and functions.
Below we provide summary statistics by region.
3.1 Institutional Structure
Around 10 percent of agencies surveyed are fully private; another 5 percent are joint public
private entities. The bulk of the agencies –62 percent– are semi-autonomous entities reporting
to a Ministry or the Oﬃce of the President or the Prime Minister. The reminder –23 per-
cent of the agencies– are sub-units of a Ministry, and therefore subject to government hiring
regulations, and pay scales. The regions with the lowest percentage of agencies structured as
a sub-unit of a Ministry are the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), where only 11 percent of agencies are under the direct control of a Ministry.
The region with the highest percentage of agencies under a sub-unit of a Ministry is Eastern
Europe and Asia (EEA) with 36 percent. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is below
average with 17 percent of its agencies subject to the direct control of a Ministry.
Within the 73 agencies that reported having an executive board, on average half the seats
in the board –53 percent to be precise– represent the private sector. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of the share of seats granted to the private sector by region. The largest share is
among OECD agencies, and within the developing world LAC has the highest median at 58
percent.
Finally, 80 percent of the agencies are either the only export promotion agency in the
country or are clearly the largest and most important, although there are signiﬁcant public
and private agencies working in closely related areas. This includes umbrella organizations
in which all private sector associations are members. In 20 percent of the countries surveyed
there are 2 or more agencies of equal importance. There are few diﬀerences across regions,
but SSA is the region where multiple EPAs are most rare.
83.2 Responsibilities
In terms of responsibilities, we explored whether the agency in charge of export promotion
activities was exclusively dedicated to export promotion, and if not, we asked the degree of
priority granted to export promotion within the agency. Figure 2 summarizes the degree of
priority given to export promotion across regions. There is a contrast between the OECD, and
MENA on the one hand, and LAC and EEA, on the other. For the former, export promotion
is the top priority of the agencies (values 1 and 2 in the histogram) in almost 70 to 80 percent
of the countries. In the second group, the agencies for which export promotion is the top
priority represent 50 percent of the cases.
3.3 Objectives and Strategies
The main objective pursued by 60 percent of the agencies surveyed is to increase aggregate
exports, no matter which sector or how big or small the export volumes. Around 18 percent
of agencies aim to promote non traditional exports only, and around 20 percent target speciﬁc
sectors. Around 2 percent attempt to develop industrial clusters, and other objectives. There
are some interesting diﬀerences across regions, as illustrated in Figure 3. Clearly, the objective
of OECD agencies is primarily to promote overall exports, whereas in LAC the promotion of
non-traditional exports is the most frequent strategy. In EEA, MENA, and SSA the focus
on particular sectors is more common than elsewhere –even though most agencies in these
regions focus primarily on overall exports.
We also asked the agencies whether the export promotion strategy was part of a national
economic development plan. Almost 80 percent of agencies answered that this was the case,
but again there are some interesting diﬀerences across regions: 60 percent of OECD agencies
answered yes; 65 percent in LAC; 70 percent in MENA; 89 percent in SSA, and 100 percent
in EEA.
93.4 Resources and Expenditures
The average budget of EPAs surveyed is around 0.11 percent of the value of exports of goods
and services, with a standard deviation of 0.35 and a median of 0.04 percent. The region with
the largest average budget is LAC at 0.17 percent of exports. It is followed by EEA at 0.12
percent, and then MENA, SSA, and the OECD with average budgets of around 0.09 to 0.10
percent of exports. The distribution within regions varies as shown in Figure 4. The OECD
has the bulk of its agencies’ budget between 0.03 and 0.13 percent of exports (agencies within
the 25th and 75th percentile). In SSA, the bulk of the agencies is between 0.00 and 0.05; the
large mean is explained by the fact that a few countries have extremely large budgets relative
to exports, often supported by multilateral and bilateral donors.
Regarding funding sources, around 52 percent of the agencies obtained more than 75
percent of their budget from public funding; 2 percent of the agencies obtained more than 75
percent of their budget from private funding; 3 percent of the agencies obtained more than
75 percent of their budget from selling their services (customer fees); and 2 percent of the
agencies obtained more than 75 percent of their budget from either multilateral or bilateral
donors. Thus, public funding seems to predominate as a source of funding. Three quarters
of the agencies surveyed had no private funding, and half had no income associated with the
selling of their services. When they reported some income, it represented on average less
than 10 percent of their budget. The importance of public funding varies across regions as
illustrated in Figure 5. The region where public funding may be less predominant is Latin
America, where only 35 percent of the agencies reported that public funding represented more
than 75 percent of their total budget. The largest share of agencies funded at more than 75
percent by public funding is found in EEA.
3.5 Activities and client orientation
We considered four main activities: 1) country image building (advertising, promotional
events, but also advocacy); 2) export support services (exporter training, technical assis-
tance, capacity building, including regulatory compliance, information on trade ﬁnance, logis-
10tics, customs, packaging, pricing); 3) marketing (trade fairs, exporter and importer missions,
follow-up services oﬀered by representatives abroad); and 4) market research and publications
(general, sector and ﬁrm level information, such as market surveys, on-line information on
export markets and electronic bulletin, publications encouraging ﬁrms to export, importer
and exporter contact databases). Figure 6 provides a view of the share spent on each of these
activities by region. The largest share is generally spent on marketing and market research
and publications. Another item which shows a large median –but also a much larger variance–
is other activities not related to export promotion, except in the OECD, where the bulk (more
than 75 percent of them) spent less than 10 percent on activities not related to export promo-
tion. At the opposite end, in SSA other activities not related to export promotion represent
between 10 and 25 percent of the budget of most agencies (at the median). The importance
of export support services is also much larger in SSA than in other regions. In LAC, EEA
and MENA the distribution of the budget allocated to each activity is very similar.
In terms of client orientation, the data cover the percentage of expenditures spent on large
versus small and medium size ﬁrms, and established versus new and occasional exporters.
Results are quite clear across regions. A very small share of total expenditure is spent on
large ﬁrms, whereas a relatively large share is spent on established exporters. Thus, in all
regions the focus of the agencies is on small and medium size ﬁrms that are established
exporters. As shown in Figure 7, LAC and SSA agencies are at opposite ends when it comes
to the share of expenditure on established ﬁrms (with LAC having the highest share and SSA
the lowest).
In terms of representation abroad, 41 percent of the agencies have oﬃces abroad (22 percent
of the agencies in SSA, 33 percent of the agencies in MENA, 35 percent of the agencies in
LAC, 47 percent in EEA and 67 percent in the OECD). In most regions agencies spend a
small amount of their budget on oﬃces abroad, with the exception of the OECD where on
average 39 percent of the EPA budget is dedicated to oﬃces abroad. In other regions, the
average is 7 percent in LAC and EEA, 4 percent in SSA, and 1 percent in MENA. In terms
of the geographic coverage of the agencies abroad, Figure 8 highlights the importance in the
11expenditures of Western Europe and North America (Canada and the United States). In all
regions, with the exception of LAC, export promotion agencies spend a larger share of their
budget for oﬃces abroad in Western Europe.
4 The empirical framework
Our objective is to disentangle the eﬀects of export promotion agencies, their structure, re-
sponsibilities, strategies, resources and activities on overall exports in order to understand
what works and what doesn’t. The ﬁrst step is to explore whether there is any correlation
between export promotion budgets and exports. Figure 9 provides a plot of exports per
capita on EPA budgets per capita. There is a clear positive correlation between these two
variables. Figure 9 also provides the predicted value obtained from the corresponding locally
weighted regression (lowess), which provides us with some prima-facie evidence of which are
the agencies that are under-performing in terms of exports per capita given their budgets.10
For example Rwanda (RWA) would be expected to have a much higher level of exports given
the budget of its EPA (under-performer), whereas the Irish agency (IRL) would be expected
to have a lower level of exports (over-performer).
An interesting feature is that the curve ﬂattens at very high budgets. Most of the countries
among this group of high-budget agencies are developed countries. To test for heterogeneity
between developed and developing countries we divided the sample accordingly. Figure 10
shows the two scatter plots. Clearly, the positive correlation is driven by developing country
data, and the correlation between exports and the budget of export promotion agencies is
unclear within the sub-sample of developed countries.
There are three clear problems with the correlations discussed above. First, the sample
might be biased, because it is restricted to the agencies for which we were able to ﬁnd a local
contact. It is further restricted to agencies that answered the survey, even though we had a
10An in depth and robust analysis of each agency performance is beyond the scope of this paper and would
need to be tackled through agency-speciﬁc studies. In this paper, we limit the scope at providing averages
across diﬀerent groups and variables.
12perhaps surprisingly high 76 percent response rate.11 Second, other factors could be correlated
with both exports and EPA budgets, which will also result in spurious correlations between
the two variables of interest. Third, the direction of causality might go from exports to the
EPA budgets, as countries with higher exports might tend to provide more generous funding
to their EPAs than other countries.
We correct selection bias by using a selection equation (Heckman, 1979) that explains why
some countries were not surveyed, and why some agencies did not answer. Our experience
collecting contact information for EPAs helped us identify variables that should be part of
this selection equation. It was clear that in poorer and smaller countries it was more diﬃcult
to obtain contact information for the relevant Ministry or institution, and even when we did,
it was diﬃcult to get them to answer the survey. So GDP per capita and GDP are part of
the selection equation. Aid per capita also seemed to be an important determinant because
many of the poorest agencies were substantially funded by bilateral and multilateral donors.
More formally, the selection equation that explains the latent variable z∗
c, which captures the












where ξ is a vector of parameters and xc is a matrix of independent variables determining
the probability that the EPA in country c answered the survey. The latter includes variables
explaining exports below, except the budget of the EPA and the activities of the agency that
help us identify the export equation plus the log of GDP, the log of aid per capita discussed
above, and dummy variables identifying developing countries in Africa, EEA, Latin America,
Sub-Saharan Africa, and the OECD.
Regarding the endogeneity of export promotion, we control for numerous determinants of
exports that may be also correlated with export promotion budgets. The control variables
11Even with such a high response rate, it may still not be a representative sample.
13we considered are: GDP per capita, an index of trade restrictiveness imposed on imports, an
index of trade restrictiveness faced by each country’s exports in the rest of the world, volatility
of the exchange rate, an indicator of the regulatory burden that measures the average number
of days it takes to comply with all necessary regulations to export goods, the geography-
determined trade to GDP ratio, and regional dummies for EEA, LAC, MENA, SSA, and the
OECD. We also estimated speciﬁcations with infrastructure variables (share of paved roads,
main telephone lines per capita) and indices of institutional quality (ICRG indices) as control
variables. These are highly collinear with GDP per capita and were not statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, in some cases they signiﬁcantly reduced our sample because of missing data. Since
this paper is about what works in terms of export promotion, and these variables did not
aﬀect qualitatively our results on export promotion, we do not report these speciﬁcations.
Nevertheless, reverse causality and omitted-variable biase may still be problematic. In
order to address these issues, we oﬀer two alternatives. First, we estimate a treatment eﬀect
regression where we use as instruments the log of aid per capita and regional dummies. In
this treatment regression we also control for sample selection bias. Unfortunately, we cannot
estimate the eﬀects of diﬀerent EPA modalities in this framework, because these are perfectly
collinear with the treatment eﬀect (i.e., the existence of an EPA). Second, to further address
the potential reverse causality, we instrument EPA budgets with the number of years since the
agency was created. It is not clear how the longevity of an EPA aﬀects its budget. On the one
hand, experienced EPAs could have larger budgets as they become rooted in the government’s
institutional structure, and its staﬀ become more knowledgable and inﬂuential in budgetary
decisionmaking. On the other hand, one of the critiques of the previous generation of EPAs is
that they were not adequately funded, and there may be some hysteresis in the corresponding
budgets. As discussed in the next section, it turns out that the older the EPA, the larger is
its budget. Moreover, the number of years since the creation of the EPA does not seem to be
a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of exports per capita, which suggests that the number
of years is a valid instrument for EPA’s budget per capita in the export equation.
The basic export equation to be estimated is then:
14ln(Exp/pop)c = β0 + β1ln(Bud/pop)c + β2ln(GDP/pop)c + β3ln(T)c + β4ln(MA)c
+ β5ln(V ol)c + β6lnRegc + β7lnF&Rc + DummiesR + ec (2)
where βs are parameters to be estimated. Exp/popc are exports per capita in country c, and
Bud/popc is the budget of the EPA per capita in country c. GDP/popc is GDP per capita
measured as the average for the period 2000-2004 in 2005 constant U.S. dollars from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Tc is an index of trade restrictiveness imposed
by country c on its imports from the rest of the world, MAc is an index of market access
restrictions imposed by the rest of the world on exports of country c, and both are borrowed
from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). V olc is the volatility of the exchange rate in country
c, measured by the coeﬃcient of variation of the dollar to local currency exchange rate during
the period 2000-2004 obtained from the World Development Indicators. Regc is the number
of days it takes to comply with export regulations and procedures from Djankov, Freund and
Pham (2006). F&Rc is the geography-determined trade to GDP ratio provided in Frankel and
Romer (1999), which was estimated using a trade gravity framework where only geographic
variables were used as explanatory variables of bilateral trade ﬂows.12 DummiesR are regional
dummies, and ec is the standard white-noise error. When testing for what works and what
doesn’t in EPA modalities we add to (2) the variables discussed in section 3.
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
estimator. The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is generally more eﬃcient than
the two-step approach (LIML), especially in the presence of high levels of correlation between
the explanatory variables of the selection and main equations (the two exclusion restrictions
we imposed are aid per capita and the log of GDP).13 We also provide OLS estimates, as
12The idea is that EPAs cannot inﬂuence the geographic components of trade, such as geographic distance
and common borders between trading partners, but their budget may be correlated with the geography-
determined trade to GDP ratio as countries with larger trade ﬂows might provide better funding to their
EPAs.
13See Puhani (2000) for a survey of the literature. Note however that results of the two-step and the FIML
approach were very similar.
15it performs better than full and limited information maximum likelihood when the variables
associated with the exclusion restrictions are also directly correlated with the outcome variable,
as shown by Rendtel (1992) using Monte Carlo simulations.14
5 Results
The result from the estimation of (1) and (2) are shown in Table 1 for the whole sample and for
developing countries using OLS and a Heckman correction. For the Heckman estimation we
also report the selection equation. Across all speciﬁcations the EPA budget has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on exports. In the sub-sample of developing countries the eﬀect
is slightly smaller, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Note also that the
selection parameter λ is not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the full sample but it is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant in the developing country sub-sample, which suggests that sample
selection is not really an issue in the full sample, but it may be a problem when working with
developing countries only. This is also conﬁrmed by the fact that OLS estimates are quite
close to Heckman estimates in the full sample, but there are some larger diﬀerences for the
developing country sub-sample.15
A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the eﬀect calculated at the median
value both in the full sample and in the sub-sample of developing countries, of an additional
$1 of EPA budget generates around $200 of additional exports. This seems large, but the
elasticity at the median of the sample explains only 8 percent of the median country exports.
This is within the range of estimates by Rose (2007) discussed earlier, which suggest that the
presence of a consulate or embassy engaged on export promotion leads to a 6 to 10 percent
increase in exports. Also, this is not a welfare calculation, and such “returns” may be con-
sistent with a welfare loss associated with EPA’s activities, as discussed earlier. Nevertheless
14Admittedly, economic size and aid per capita may directly aﬀect exports per capita. However, empirically,
aid per capita was not signiﬁcant after controlling for the presence of EPAs. This suggests that it is a valid
instrumental variable.
15An alternative explanation is that there is selection, but that our correction has not done an adequate
job. However, the fact that several of the variables in the selection equation are signiﬁcant, and in particular
log of aid per capita and log of GDP (which are our exclusion restrictions) suggests that this is not the case.
16they are encouraging numbers, when measured in terms of export returns. However, the es-
timated elasticities of about 0.10 suggest that there are strong diminishing returns to scale.
Consequently, large expansions of EPAs budgets may not be desirable.16
Regarding the other explanatory variables in the regression in Table 1, GDP per capita (ln
GDP/pop) has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant sign in all speciﬁcations suggesting that
richer countries, with stronger and better institutions –including trade institutions– export
more. The restrictiveness of the exporting country import regime (ln T) does not seem to aﬀect
export performance, suggesting that general equilibrium eﬀects are not a strong determinant
of exports.17 In contrast, the restrictiveness faced by exporters (ln MA) in the rest of the
world strongly reduces exports across all speciﬁcations with a slightly higher coeﬃcient for
developing countries when correcting for sample selection bias. Exchange rate volatility (ln
V ol) also has a negative impact on exports, although it is statistically signiﬁcant only in
the case of the full sample after correcting for sample bias.18 The number of days necessary
to comply with export regulation in the exporting country has a negative, but generally
insigniﬁcant impact on exports. The geography component of the trade to GDP ratio as
provided in Frankel and Romer (1999) is always positive and statistically signiﬁcant.19
As discussed in the previous section, the results in Table 1 might suﬀer from reverse
causality, as countries that export more might be more likely to establish EPAs, and from
16The next subsection discusses a break point (around $1 per capita of EPA expenditures) above which the
marginal returns become negative.
17This result also suggests that in the early 2000s contrary to what was observed by Keesing and Singer
(1991a) in the 1980s, the main constraint to exports is no longer the anti-trade bias of the import regime.
18The lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of nominal exchange-rate volatility on exports is consistent with recent result
reported by Tenreyro (2007). This author shows that estimates of the eﬀect of volatility on exports are quite
fragile in the context of the gravity model of trade. The intutitive argument is that on the one hand, volatility
reduces trade as it might act as friction against international transactions (i.e., by raising the costs of trade).
On the other hand, exchange-rate ﬂuctuations can oﬀer proﬁt opportunities for traders. Hence the net eﬀect
might be ambiguous. Also, the existence of ﬁnancial instruments that help agents protect themselves against
risk would also support the view that volatility might not have signiﬁcant deleterious eﬀects on international
trade ﬂows.
19In both selection equations, size and aid per capita –which are our exclusion restrictions– have a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, except for aid per capita in the developing country sub-sample where the coeﬃcient
has a p-value of 0.130. Thus, larger countries receiving large amounts of aid were more likely to be in our
sample. This reﬂects in part, our capacity to identify the relevant agency in the country (as we were helped
by World Bank’s country economists), but also the agencies capacity to answer the survey.
17the potential correlation of EPA’s budget with omitted variables in the export equation. To
address these concerns, the ﬁrst column of Table 2 provides a treatment eﬀect estimate, where
the treatment is the presence of an export promotion agency, which is instrumented with log
of aid per capita.20 The coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant suggesting that the
presence of EPA helps; all the other coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to the ones reported
in Table 1. Note, however, that the negative coeﬃcient on exchange rate volatility becomes
statistically signiﬁcant in the treatment regression. Results for the presence of the EPA in the
treatment regression –not reported– suggest that presence of an EPA is well explained by aid
per capita, which has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, as well as the volatility
of the exchange rate and the geography-determined trade to GDP ratio which both make the
presence of an EPA less likely. The regulation burden on exporters makes the presence of an
EPA more likely, and EPAs are more likely to be found in the OECD and less likely to be
found in SSA.21 Results for the developing country sub-sample are very similar (coeﬃcients
are within one standard deviations of the ones reported for the full sample in Table 2) and
are available upon request.
We also provide two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the export equation, where
EPA’s budget per capita is instrumented using the number of years since the agency was
created. As shown in the Auxiliary Regressions appendix, older EPAs tend to have larger
budgets. Moreover, the number of years since the EPA was created is not a statistically
signiﬁcant determinant of exports per capita. The second column in Table 2 provides a 2SLS
estimation of the export equation for the full sample, and without correcting for sample bias.
Columns three and four in Table 2 provide the 2SLS maximum likelihood Heckman estimates
where EPA’s budget is instrumented using the number of years since the agency was created,
for the full sample and for the sub-sample of developing countries.
20We also control for sample selection bias using a 2-step Heckman correction using the log of GDP and log
of aid per capita as the exclusion restrictions. Note that there is still a need to correct for sample bias in this
treatment regression, as for some countries (observations) we do not know whether there is an EPA in place
or not.
21Note that the coeﬃcient on the λ (Mills ratio) is statistically signiﬁcant suggesting that sample bias was
a problem.
18The interesting result from these 2SLS regressions is that the coeﬃcient on EPA’s budget
declines considerably relative to those estimated in Table 1. One potential explanation for this
is that countries that export large amounts tend to have larger EPA’s budget.22 Nevertheless,
coeﬃcients are still positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero across all speciﬁcations. A
quick back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the eﬀect calculated at the median value
of an additional $1 of EPA budget generates around $40 of additional exports in the full
sample and $60 in the sub-sample of developing countries. Again, EPA budgets are small
relative to exports, and the median budget explains only 1.7 percent of median exports.23
Indeed, the estimated elasticities of 0.02-0.03 imply severly diminishing returns to scale.
Regarding the control variables, the log of GDP per capita, the log of trade restrictiveness
in the rest of the world, and the log of geography-determined trade to GDP ratio are the
most robust determinants of exports per capita across speciﬁcations. Exchange-rate volatility
always has a negative sign, but it is never statistically diﬀerent from zero.24
5.1 Heterogeneity across regions and levels of income
We also explored the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of export promotion budgets across regions
and levels of income by allowing the coeﬃcient to vary by regions (EEA, LAC, MENA, OECD
and SSA) in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3 and by level of income (GDP per capita) in the
last two columns of Table 3. Estimates using 2SLS with and without a maximum likelihood
Heckman correction are presented. But note that the estimates with and without sample
22Note that only a handful of countries in our sample report explicitly taxing exports to ﬁnance EPA’s
budget, but other mechanisms, such as political economy consideratios, can explain this.
23This is signiﬁcantly below the 6 to 10 percent estimate that Rose (2006) attributes to the export promotion
role played by embassies and consulates. One explanation of these diﬀerences is that there is a larger number
of developing countries in our sample than in Rose’s article. Also, as discussed in the ﬁnal sub-section, the
presence of foreign oﬃces seem to have a negative eﬀect on exports in developing countries.
24The endogeneity issue could further be tackled with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, but this requires
panel data. There are three problems with this. First, agencies may change names without much deeper
changes and we will have a late starting date for the agency, while it has existed for a long time. Second, the
agencies in the 1980s are apparently a very diﬀerent animal from the agencies today, and diﬀerent agencies
have reformed at diﬀerent times. A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach will not capture that. Finally, some of
our explanatory variables are only available for the early 1990s. This is the case of the trade restrictiveness
index and the market access trade restrictiveness index.
19correction are not very diﬀerent from each other, which is also signalled by a statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the Mills ratio.
In terms of region heterogeneity, EEA, LAC, and SSA are the regions where the export
promotion budgets seem to have the strongest impact on exports, which are also statistically
diﬀerent from zero. For the OECD and MENA the coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Note also that although EEA has the largest point estimate its coeﬃcient is not
statistically diﬀerent from the one obtained for SSA. Thus, although there is some interesting
heterogeneity across regions, we do not seem to be able to estimate it very precisely. All the
other coeﬃcients show a similar pattern to the one observed in Tables 1 and 2.
One could use the Heckman estimates to compare the “return” for each $ invested on
export promotion across regions. A quick back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that for
each $1 invested on export promotion there are $100 of additional exports in EEA, $70 in
LAC, $38 in SSA, $5 in the OECD, and $53 less exports in MENA. But it is important to
recall that the estimates for the OECD and MENA are not statistically diﬀerent from zero,
and the estimates for the other three regions are not statistically diﬀerent from each other.
Columns three and four of Table 3 presents the results regarding the heterogeneity of
the impact of EPA’s budget across levels of development, with and without sample bias
correction. Again, there is no much diﬀerence between the estimates of columns three and
four, suggesting that this is not an issue in the full sample. The estimates suggest that at low
levels of development the eﬀect of EPA expenditures on exports may be negative, but this
rapidly increases with the level of income.
However, the eﬀect of the level of development on the estimated eﬃcacy of EPA expen-
ditures might be capturing underlying correlations among the level of development, the size
of EPA budgets, and the marginal returns to EPA expenditures. As can be seen in the top
quadrant of Figure 11 –where we plotted the predicted eﬀect of EPA’s budget on log of ex-
ports per capita from the Heckman estimations against the size of the EPA budget– there is
an inverted U-shape relationship between the eﬀect of EPA budgets on the log of exports per
capita and the size of EPA budgets per capita. This suggests –everything else equal– that at
20very low or high levels of EPA budgets, returns may be smaller than at intermediate levels.
That is, beyond a certain level of EPA budgets, around $1 per capita, the marginal returns of
EPA budgets are negative. Thus, at very low budgets, a budget increase is likely to increase
the eﬃcacy of the EPA, but at larger budgets increases may be counterproductive. Figure 11
also shows the correlation between income per capita and EPA budgets in the middle right
quadrant. Unsurprisingly, richer countries have bigger budgets. Furthermore, the bottom
right quadrant suggests that the correlation of GDP per capita with log of exports per capita
monotonically increases with income per capita. That is –everything else equal– richer coun-
tries (with better institutions) tend to have more eﬀective EPAs. Thus small budgets may be
suﬃcient in rich countries, but may not provide an eﬃcient tool to promote exports in poor
countries (as argued by Keesing and Singer among others).
5.2 What works, what doesn’t?
To explore the type of institutional structures, strategies, and activities that are more eﬃcient
we added to our basic speciﬁcation in (2) some of the variables discussed in section 3. Results
using a 2SLS maximum likelihood Heckman estimator –where the log of EPA’s budget per
capita is instrumented using the number of years since the EPA was created– are presented
in Table 4 for the full sample, as well as the sub-sample of developing countries.
The top of the table shows the estimates for the variables in (2), which are qualitatively
similar to the ones in Tables 1 and 2. EPA’s budget per capita, GDP per capita, and the
geography-determined trade to GDP ratios have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on exports per capita in both samples. The trade restrictiveness of the rest of the world faced
by exporters and the volatility of the exchange rate have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on exports per capita in both samples. The burden of export regulations is negative
and signiﬁcant in the full sample, but not in the sub-sample of developing countries.
Regarding the selection equation, trade restrictions at home and exchange-rate volatility
reduce the probability of observing an EPA. Interestingly, trade restrictions imposed by the
rest of the world are positively correlated with the existence of an EPA in the full sample, but
21they are negatively correlated in the sub-sample of developing countries. Hence developing
countries that restrict their trade and face market access barriers abroad, and thus have
relatively large anti-export biases at home, are unlikely to have an EPA.
More importantly, the two exclusion restrictions in the selection equation (log of aid per
capita and log of GDP) are, as before, positive and statistically signiﬁcant.25 Also, the Mills
ratio (λ) is statistically signiﬁcant in both samples suggesting that sample selection bias needed
to be addressed in both samples. This contrasts with earlier results for the full sample reported
in Tables 1 to 3, but note that because of the inclusion of the new additional variables we
lost a signiﬁcant number of observations (not all agencies answered all questions). In Table 4
we only have 51 uncensored observations in the full sample compared to 78 in Tables 1 to 3
which explains why sample selection bias became an issue in the full sample.
The bottom of the table reports estimates for the additional variables capturing EPA
modalities. In both regressions, exports increase with the share of the EPA executive board
seats that are held by the private sector. But exports also increase with the share of EPA
funding coming from the public sector. This suggests that agencies that are directed by the
private sector, but have public funding are the best performers. After all, the rationale for
export promotion is about externalities, and it may be diﬃcult to raise private sector funding
when beneﬁts are diﬀuse.
The proliferation of agencies dedicated to export promotion within a country (“Degree of
decentralization of agencies”) hurts exports. A single and strong EPA seems to be the most
eﬀective.26 Note, however, that the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant in the sub-sample
of developing countries.
Exports are also higher when the strategy of the agency is to focus on non-traditional
exports or has some sector speciﬁc component, rather than just focus on overall exports.
Note, however, that by sector focus we mean broad aggregates (agriculture, manufacturing,
services, tourism, etc...), rather than speciﬁc products. Also, this eﬀect is not statistically
25And log of aid per capita is not a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of exports per capita.
26This is a discrete variable that takes the value 1 if there is only one EPA in the country, 2 if there is one
large, but many small agencies, 3 if there are two mayor agencies and several small, and 4 if there are more
than two large agencies and several small agencies.
22diﬀerent from zero for the sub-sample of developing countries.
The allocation of expenditures between country image, export support services, marketing
and market research does not seem to matter in the sub-sample of developing countries.
However, in the full sample, exports fall with the share of the budget spent on research and
increases with the share of the budget spent on export support services (although the latter
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant). This provides weak evidence that on-shore activities may
be more productive than oﬀ-shore activities.
Exports increase with the share of the budget spent on large clients and declines with the
share of the budget spent on established exporters, which suggest the focus should be on large
ﬁrms (which have the potential to export), but are not yet exporting. This holds both for the
full sample, and the sub-sample of developing countries.
The more interesting diﬀerences between the full sample and the sub-sample of developing
countries concerns the use of EPA’s oﬃce representations abroad. They have a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in the full sample, but a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
impact in the sub-sample of developing countries. Thus the evidence provides little support
for funding foreign oﬃces by EPAs in developing countries, and suggests that there may be
lessons to be drawn from the use of foreign oﬃces by developed country EPAs.
6 Concluding Remarks
In their inﬂuential study of export promotion agencies in the 1980s, Hogan, Keesing, and
Singer (1991) argued that EPAs in developing countries were not eﬀective because they lacked
strong leadership, had inadequate funding, were too bureaucratic, and not client oriented, with
heavy government involvement. Moreover, they also had to overcome strong anti-trade biases
to be eﬀective.
Over the last decade, the structure and activities of EPAs changed in the direction sug-
gested by Hogan, Keesing and Singer, and under the auspices of the International Trade
Center in Geneva. Also, trade policies became more export-oriented. Our estimates suggest
23that today’s EPAs are eﬀective in terms of having an impact on national exports. For every
$1 in the EPA budget there is an additional $100 dollars of exports in EEA, $70 in LAC, $38
in SSA, $5 in the OECD and -$53 in MENA, although the last two estimates are not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero. On average, exports increase with EPAs’ budgets, even though
our estimates suggest that at levels around $1 per capita the marginal eﬃciency may become
negative.
In terms of what works and what doesn’t, our estimates suggest that EPAs should have
a large share of the executive board in the hands of the private sector, but they should also
have a large share of public sector funding. In other words, a full privatization of EPAs does
not seem to work. A single and strong EPA should be preferred to the sometimes observed
proliferation of agencies within countries. Results also suggest that EPAs should focus on non-
traditional exports or have some broad sector orientation, rather than attempt to promote
overall exports. They should also focus on large ﬁrms that are not yet exporters, rather than
on small ﬁrms and established exporters. Also EPA oﬃces abroad have a positive eﬀect on
exports in the full sample, but a negative impact in the sub-sample for developing countries,
suggesting that agencies in developing countries are better oﬀ focusing on on-shore activities,
and have probably something to learn from the experience of developed countries with EPA’s
oﬃce representations abroad.
Last but not least, words of caution are warranted. First, regarding the methodology used
to derive these conclusions, cross-country regressions cannot fully capture the heterogeneity of
policy environments and institutional structures in which agencies operate, without running
out of degrees of freedom. To complement our study and provide adequate policy advice, case
studies are needed. Second, the large average “returns” to EPA expenditures do not provide
a justiﬁcation for those budgets on welfare grounds, as these will need some measurement of
the externalities and net beneﬁts associated with export promotion. Moreover, larger returns
may be obtained by investing those resources in improving the overall business climate (in-
frastructure, education, etc.), and we do not provide such an analysis. The analyses discussed
in this paper do provide guidelines in terms of institutional design, objectives and activities of
24EPAs that help maximize the impact of EPAs on exports. Finally, the evidence of diminishing
returns to scale in EPA budgets, and negative marginal returns above certain levels, suggests
that small (but not tiny) is beautiful when it comes to EPAs.
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29Table 2: Reverse causality?a
Treatment 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
2-step Heckman No Heckman ML Heckman ML Heckman
All All All Developing
countries countries countries countries
Log of Budget per capita 0.0196?? 0.0195?? 0.031??
(ln Bud/pop)b ( 0.006 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.009 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.741 ?? 0.819 ?? 0.828 ?? 0.768 ??
(ln GDP/pop) ( 0.249 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.184 ) ( 0.147 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -0.200 0.051 -0.009 -0.038
(ln T) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.175 ) ( 0.5218 ) ( 0.193 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -2.116 ?? -1.188 ?? -1.270 -2.096 ??
(ln MA) ( 0.720 ) ( 0.423 ) ( 0.798 ) ( 0.122 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.219?? -0.124 -0.135 -0.316
(ln V ol) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.411 ) ( 0.356 )
Days to comply with export -0.007 -0.010?? -0.009? 0.004
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.009 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.627?? 0.627?? 0.618?? 0.726??
(ln F&R) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.209 ) ( 0.217 ) ( 0.228 )
Treatment 1.096??
(Dummy=1 if EPA exists) ( 0.105 )
Constant -8.063?? -4.426??? -4.923 -7.839??
( 0.718 ) ( 0.631 ) ( 3.521 ) ( 1.431 )
Regional dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Chi-squared Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 142 78 144 120
Number of uncensored 99 77 62
R-squared NA 0.955 NA NA
λd 0.899?? NA 0.140 0.502??
( 0.265 ) ( 1.514 ) ( 0.092 )
aAll regressions used a 2SLS estimator, except the treatment regression where the treatment is estimated
using maximum likelihood. Estimates for the ﬁrst stage regression are provided in the Auxiliary Regressions
Appendix. In the case of the treatment regression we also correct for sample selection bias, using a two step
approach.
bStandard errors are in parenthesis and corrected non-parametrically for clustering within region. ?? stands
for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
cThe regional dummies are LAC, OECD, EEA, MENA, and SSA.
dThe selection parameter λ (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically diﬀerent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.
30Table 3: Heterogeneity of the impact of EPAs’ budget on exports
By region-2SLS By level of income-2SLS
No Heckman FIML Heckman No Heckman FIML Heckman
Log of Budget per capita -0.376?? -0.355??
(ln Bud/pop)a ( 0.086 ) ( 0.040 )
Log of Budget per capita in LAC 0.033?? 0.029?
(ln Bud/pop*LAC dummy) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.018 )
Log of Budget per capita in OECD 0.004 0.004
(ln Bud/pop*OECD dummy) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.028 )
Log of Budget per capita in Asia 0.053?? 0.053??
(ln Bud/pop*EEA dummy) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.016 )
Log of Budget per capita in MENA -0.004 0.003
(ln Bud/pop*MENA dummy) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.018 )
Log of Budget per capita in SSA 0.022?? 0.024??
(ln Bud/pop*SSA dummy) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.012 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.820?? 0.826?? 0.978?? 0.975??
(ln GDP/pop) ( 0.187 ) ( 0.170 ) ( 0.168 ) ( 0.156 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness 0.032 -0.002 0.138 0.109
(ln T) ( 0.187 ) ( 0.300 ) ( 0.158 ) ( 0.179 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.175?? -1.249?? -1.580?? -1.607??
(ln MA) ( 0.462 ) ( 0.510 ) ( 0.432 ) ( 0.415 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.124 -0.139 -0.110 -0.113
(ln V ol) ( 0.206 ) ( 0.325 ) ( 0.157 ) ( 0.189 )
Days to comply with export -0.010?? -0.009?? 0.001 0.001
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.636?? 0.631?? 0.652?? 0.646??
(ln F&R) ( 0.196 ) ( 0.175 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.151 )
Interaction Budget and Income 0.046?? 0.043??
(ln Bud/pop)* (ln GDP/pop) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.004 )
Interaction Budget and Income squared -0.0002?? -0.0002??
(lnBud/pop ∗ lnGDP/pop)2 ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0001 )
Constant -4.466?? -5.323?? -7.122?? -7.261 ???
( 0.696 ) ( 1.115 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.707 )
Regional dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
P − value of F or Chi-squared Wald-test.c 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 78 144 78 144
Number of uncensored 78 77 78 77
R-squared 0.956 NA 0.959 NA
λd NA 0.121 NA 0.082
( 0.783 ) ( 0.338 )
aStandard errors are in parenthesis and corrected non-parametrically for clustering within region. ?? stands
for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
bThe regional dummies are LAC, OECD, EEA, MENA, and SSA.
cFor OLS estimates we report the F-test and for Heckman estimates we report the Wald test on the joint
signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients.
dThe selection parameter λ (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically diﬀerent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.Table 4: EPAs: what works, what doesn’t?a
All countries Developing Countries
Export eq. Selection eq. Export eq. Selection eq.
Log of Budget per capita 0.044?? 0.046??
(ln Bud/pop)b ( 0.017 ) ( 0.012 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.669?? -0.059 0.510?? -0.011
(ln GDP/pop) ( 0.153 ) ( 0.290 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.393 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -0.022 -0.919?? 0.155 -0.434??
(ln T) ( 0.141 ) ( 0.252 ) ( 0.200 ) ( 0.202 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.839?? 1.424?? -2.268?? -0.565??
(ln MA) ( 0.152 ) ( 0.595 ) ( 0.176 ) ( 0.252 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.281?? -0.094?? -0.325?? -0.129??
(ln V ol) ( 0.113 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.058 )
Days to comply with export -0.018?? 0.021 -0.013 0.014
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.008 ) ( 0.031 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.360?? 0.354 0.698?? -0.269
(ln F&R) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.256 ) ( 0.080 ) ( 0.285 )
Log of aid per capita 0.537?? 0.609??
(ln Aidc) ( 0.129 ) ( 0.147 )
Log of GDP 0.680?? 0.250??
(ln (GDP) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.019 )
Executive Board seats 0.968?? 0.571??
to private sector ( 0.172 ) ( 0.242 )
Degree of decentralization of -0.215?? -0.029
agencies devoted to exp. prom. ( 0.052 ) ( 0.115 )
Share of agency budget spent 0.001 0.062
on non-export promotion activities ( 0.044 ) ( 0.043 )
Strategy focuses on non 0.159?? -0.024
traditional exports or sector speciﬁc ( 0.054 ) ( 0.059 )
Share of EPA funding coming from 0.105? 0.119??
public sources ( 0.056 ) ( 0.034 )
Share of country image activities -0.044? -0.012
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.027 ) ( 0.042 )
Share of marketing activities -0.059 -0.034
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.039 ) ( 0.045 )
Share of research activities -0.152?? -0.031
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.068) ( 0.086 )
Share of export support serv. 0.005 -0.047
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.049 ) ( 0.046 )
Share of large clients 0.115? 0.098??
in EPA expenditure ( 0.066 ) ( 0.028 )
Share of established exporters -0.058?? -0.034
in EPA expenditure ( 0.016 ) ( 0.035 )
EPA has representation 0.133? -0.114??
oﬃces abroad ( 0.082 ) ( 0.053 )
Constant -4.771?? -8.204? -5.763?? -10.497??
( 1.336 ) ( 4.828 ) ( 1.503 ) ( 4.747 )
P-value of Chi-squared Wald-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 118 118 99 99
Number of uncensored 51 51 41 41
λc 0.407?? 0.407?? 0.302?? 0.302??
( 0.105 ) ( 0.105 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.066 )
aThese are 2SLS ML Heckman estimates, where the log of EPA’s budget per capita is instrumented using
the number of years since the EPA was created. Regional dummies included in all regressions.
bStandard errors are in parenthesis and corrected non-parametrically for clustering within region. ?? stands
for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
cThe selection parameter λ (Mills ratio) captures the extent to which selection is a problem in the sample.
When statistically diﬀerent from zero, this suggest that there is a sample bias that needed to be corrected.Appendix Table: Sample Coverage





Austria Austrian Trade, Austrian Federal Economic Chamber OECD
Bangladesh EPB EEA





Burkina Faso ONAC SSA




Costa Rica Procomer LAC
Cote d’Ivoire APEX-CI SSA
Czech Republic Czech Trade EEA
Denmark Trade Council of Denmark OECD
Dominica DEXIA LAC
Dominican Republic CEI-RD LAC
Ecuador CORPEI LAC
Egypt, Arab Rep. ExpoLink MENA
El Salvador Exporta El Salvador LAC










Hong Kong, China HKTDC EEA
Hungary Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency EEA
Iceland Trade Council of Iceland OECD
Ireland Enterprise Ireland OECD
Israel Israel Export & International Cooperation Institute MENA
Jamaica JAMPRO LAC
Jordan JEDCO MENA
Kenya Export Promotion Council SSA
Latvia LIDA EEA
Lebanon IDAL MENA




Malta Malta Enterprise MENA








Norway Innovation Norway OECD
Panama National Direction of Investment & Export Promotion LAC
Paraguay PROPARAGUAY LAC
Peru Prompex LAC
Portugal ICEP Portugal OECD
Puerto Rico Compania de Comercio y Exportacion LAC
Rwanda RIEPA SSA
Senegal ASEPEX SSA
Serbia and Montenegro SIEPA EEA
Sierra Leone SLEDIC SSA
Slovak Republic SARIO EEA
Slovenia TIPO EEA
South Africa TISA SSA
Spain ICEX OECD
Sweden Swedish Trade Council OECD
Switzerland OSEC Business Network Switzerland OECD
Taiwan, China TAITRA EEA
Tanzania Board of External Trade SSA
Thailand Department of Export Promotion EEA
Trinidad and Tobago TIDCO Limited LAC
Tunisia FAMEX MENA
Turkey IGEME EEA
Uganda Uganda Export Promotion Board SSA
United Kingdom UKTI OECD
Uruguay Uruguay XXI LAC
Venezuela, RB BANCOEX LAC
Vietnam Vietrade EEA
West Bank and Gaza Paltrade MENA
Yemen, Rep. Yemen Export Supreme Council MENA
Zambia EBZ SSA
33Auxiliary Regressions
Table A reports ﬁrst stage regressions of the 2SLS estimations with and without sample
selection correction (i.e., with and without log of aid per capita and log of GDP per capita
as instruments), and with and without the additional variables discussed in Table 4. In the
the ﬁrst two columns reported in Table A, the number of years has a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact on EPA’s budget per capita suggesting that older EPA’s tend to have larger
budgets. Log of aid per capita also has a statistically signiﬁcant partial correlation with EPA
budgets in the second column. Countries receiving more aid per capita tend to have large
budgets per capita allocated to EPAs. In the third column, however, the log of number of years
since the creation of the EPA appears as a weak instrument, with a much smaller coeﬃcient
which is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The log of aid per capita is still highly signiﬁcant
in this third speciﬁcation.
Table B reports results of second stage regressions with and without sample correction, as
well as with the additional variables discussed in Table 4. In two of the three speciﬁcations
reported in Table B the log of the number of years since the creation of the EPA does not
directly explain exports per capita as the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. In the
second speciﬁcation the number of years has a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient at the 10
percent level. The log of aid per capita and log of GDP, which are used as the exclusion
restrictions in the selection equation, appear as additional explanatory variables in the second
and third columns. The log of GDP has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in
both speciﬁcations, thus suggesting that it directly aﬀects exports and therefore may not be
an appropriate variable to use in the selection equation. However, log of aid per capita does
not directly determine exports per capita, as its coeﬃcient is statistically insigniﬁcant in both
speciﬁcations, and, as seen in Table A, it is also an adequate instrument for EPA budgets as
it has a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in those regressions.
34Table A: Instrumenting EPA’s budget–1st stage regressiona
Dependent variable: EPA’s budget
Log of number of years 3.352?? 3.183?? 0.077
since creation of EPAb ( 0.313 ) ( 0.545 ) ( 0.205)
Log of GDP per capita 1.701? 1.623 0.524?
(ln GDP/pop) ( 0.926 ) ( 0.983 ) ( 0.242 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness -1.435 -1.036 0.087
(ln T) ( 1.084 ) ( 0.986 ) ( 0.582 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.794 3.072 -0.549
(ln MA) ( 1.997 ) ( 2.583 ) ( 1.573 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.280 -0.298?? -0.584??
(ln V ol) ( 0.249 ) ( 0.113 ) ( 0.149)
Days to comply with export -0.037 -0.027 -0.065??
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.060 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.015 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 1.113 1.668?? 0.858
(ln F&R) ( 0.724 ) ( 0.374 ) ( 0.781 )
Log of aid per capita 0.798?? 0.481??
(ln Aidc) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.114 )
Log of GDP 0.799 -0.211
(ln (GDP) ( 0.649 ) ( 0.427 )
Executive Board seats 1.101
to private sector ( 0.960 )
Degree of decentralization of -0.643??
agencies devoted to exp. prom. ( 0.217 )
Share of agency budget spent 0.317?
on non-export promotion activities ( 0.166 )
Strategy focuses on non -0.314
traditional exports or sector speciﬁc ( 0.222 )
Share of EPA funding coming from -0.100
public sources ( 0.162 )
Share of country image activities 0.116
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.229 )
Share of marketing activities -0.192
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.117 )
Share of research activities -0.908??
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.192 )
Share of export support serv.
in EPA’s expenditure
Share of large clients 0.036
in EPA expenditure ( 0.233 )
Share of established exporters -0.146
in EPA expenditure ( 0.226 )
EPA has representation 0.742
oﬃces abroad ( 0.479 )
Constant -27.838?? -32.194 -3.060
( 9.712 ) ( 26.936 ) ( 8.849 )
P-value of F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 78 77 51
R-squared 0.694 0.738 0.886
aThese are all OLS estimates. Regional dummies included in all regressions.
bStandard errors are in parenthesis and corrected non-parametrically for clustering within region. ?? stands
for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
35Table B: Are instruments correlated with exports per capita?a
Dependent variable: Log of exports per capita
Log of Budget per capita 0.110?? 0.089?? 0.050
(ln Bud/pop)b ( 0.038 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.063 )
Log of GDP per capita 0.670?? 0.821?? 0.799??
(ln GDP/pop) ( 0.136 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.164 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness 0.031 0.029 -0.001
(ln T) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.163 )
Log of Trade restrictiveness in ROW -1.340?? -2.582?? -0.549
(ln MA) ( 0.274 ) ( 0.338 ) ( 0.440 )
Log of Forex volatility -0.140 -0.061 -0.247
(ln V ol) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.170)
Days to comply with export -0.009 -0.009 -0.016
regulation (ln Reg) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.011 )
Log of geo-trade/GDP ratio 0.598?? 0.152?? 0.019
(ln F&R) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.108 ) ( 0.156 )
Log of number of years 0.076 0.076? 0.111
since EPA creation ( 0.053 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.073 )
Log of aid per capita -0.063 -0.029
(ln Aidc) ( 0.054 ) ( 0.081 )
Log of GDP -0.343?? -0.292??
(ln (GDP) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.077 )
Executive Board seats 0.629??
to private sector ( 0.251 )
Degree of decentralization of -0.201?
agencies devoted to exp. prom. ( 0.112 )
Share of agency budget spent -0.004
on non-export promotion activities ( 0.063 )
Strategy focuses on non 0.078
traditional exports or sector speciﬁc ( 0.084 )
Share of EPA funding coming from -0.066
public sources ( 0.044 )
Share of country image activities -0.028
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.073 )
Share of marketing activities -0.009
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.067 )
Share of research activities 0.002
in EPA’s expenditure ( 0.106 )
Share of export support serv.
in EPA’s expenditure
Share of large clients -0.010
in EPA expenditure ( 0.076 )
Share of established exporters -0.076?
in EPA expenditure ( 0.045 )
EPA has representation 0.129
oﬃces abroad ( 0.149 )
Constant -3.898?? 0.940 0.692
( 1.261 ) ( 1.476 ) ( 1.967 )
P-value of F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 78 77 51
R-squared 0.953 0.969 0.966
aThese are all OLS estimates. Regional dummies included in all regressions.
bStandard errors are in parenthesis and corrected non-parametrically for clustering within region. ?? stands
for signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level; and ? stands for signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level. 37 
Figure 1: Share of Executive Board seats granted to the private sector by region 
 
Note: The vertical axis shows the percentage of Executive Board seats in the hands of the private sector. 
Each box provides the bounds for the 25
th and 75
th percentile in each region, and the lines coming out of the 
box provide the adjacent value to the 25
th and 75
th percentiles in each region. The line within the box 
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Figure 2: Priority granted to export promotion within the agency by region 
 
Note: The vertical axis shows the percentage of responses that correspond to each of the categories in the 
horizontal axis. A value of 1 in the horizontal axis means that export promotion is the only activity of the 
agency; a value of 2 means that it is its top priority; a value of 3 means that it is one of its top two priorities; 
a value of 4 means that it is one of its top 3 priorities and a value of 5 means that export promotion is a 
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Figure 3: Strategy or goals of export promotion agencies by region 
 
Note: The vertical axis shows the percentage of responses that correspond to each of the categories in the 
horizontal axis. A value of 1 in the horizontal axis indicates that the agency’s goal is to promote overall 
exports; a value of 2 indicates that the goal of the agency is to promote non traditional exports only; a value 
of 3 indicates that the agency aims at promotion specific sectors, and a value of 4 indicates that the agency 
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Figure 4: Ratio of national export promotion agency budget to exports by region  
 
Note: The vertical axis shows the ratio of EPA’s budgets to total exports expressed in percentage points. 
Each box provides the bounds for the 25
th and 75
th percentile in each region, and the lines coming out of the 
box provide the adjacent value to the 25
th and 75
th percentiles in each region. The line within the box 
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Figure 5: Importance of public funding in agencies budget by region 
 
Note: The vertical axis shows the percentage of responses that correspond to each of the categories in the 
horizontal axis. The importance of public funding is a discrete variable that takes values between 1 and 6. 
A value of 1 indicates that public funding represents 0 percent of the budget; a value of 2 indicates that 
public funding is less than 10 percent of the budget; a value of 3 indicates that public funding is between 10 
and 25 percent of the budget; a value of 4 indicates that public funding is between 25 and 50 percent; a 
value of 5 indicates that public funding is between 50 and 75 percent and a value of 6 indicates that public 
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Figure 6: Export promotion agencies activities by region 
 
The share of each activity in total expenditure is a discrete variable that takes values between 1 and 6. A 
value of 1 indicates that the activity represents 0 percent of the total expenditure; a value of 2 indicates that 
the activity represents less than 10 percent of total expenditure; a value of 3 indicates that the activity 
represents between 10 and 25 percent of total expenditure; a value of 4 indicates that the activity represents 
between 25 and 50 percent; a value of 5 indicates that the activity represents between 50 and 75 percent and 
a value of 6 indicates that the activity represents more than 75 percent of total expenditure. The 5 activities 
considered are country image building (act_cou), export support services (act_ess), marketing (act_mar), 
research and publications (act_res), and other activities not related to export promotion (act_oin).  Each box 
provides the bounds for the 25
th and 75
th percentile in each region, and the lines coming out of the box 
provide the adjacent value to the 25
th and 75
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Figure 7: Export promotion agencies activities by type of client and by region 
 
The share of each type of client in total expenditure is a discrete variable that takes values between 1 and 6. 
A value of 1 indicates that the type of client represents 0 percent of the total expenditure; a value of 2 
indicates it represents less than 10 percent of total expenditure; a value of 3 indicates that it represents 
between 10 and 25 percent of total expenditure; a value of 4 indicates that it represents between 25 and 50 
percent; a value of 5 indicates that it represents between 50 and 75 percent and a value of 6 indicates that it 
represents more than 75 percent of total expenditure. The 2 types of clients considered are large (cli_lar) 
and established (cli_est). Each box provides the bounds for the 25
th and 75
th percentile in each region, and 
the lines coming out of the box provide the adjacent value to the 25
th and 75
th percentiles in each region. 
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Figure 8: Geographic decomposition of offices abroad by region 
 
Note: The share of the budget of offices abroad spent in Western Europe (WEU) and North America 
(NAM) is a discrete variable that takes values between 1 and 6. A value of 1 indicates that the expenditure 
in a particular region represents 0 percent of the total expenditure of offices abroad; a value of 2 indicates it 
represents less than 10 percent of total expenditure of offices abroad; a value of 3 indicates that it 
represents between 10 and 25 percent of total expenditure; a value of 4 indicates that it represents between 
25 and 50 percent; a value of 5 indicates that it represents between 50 and 75 percent and a value of 6 
indicates that it represents more than 75 percent of total expenditure. Each box provides the bounds for the 
25
th and 75
th percentile in each region, and the lines coming out of the box provide the adjacent value to the 
25
th and 75
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Note: Authors’ calculations using data from the survey and World Bank’s WDI. The lowess smoother used 
involves running a locally weighted  regression of the log of exports of goods and services per capita on the 
log of the export promotion agency budget per capita for small sub-samples of data (we used the STATA 9 
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Note: Authors’ calculations using data from the survey and World Bank’s WDI. The lowess smoother used 
involves running a locally weighted  regression of the log of exports of goods and services per capita on the 
log of the export promotion agency budget per capita for small sub-samples of data (we used the STATA 9 
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Note: The top axis is the predicted impact of EPA budget on exports per capita, and the bottom right axis is 
the predicted impact of GDP per capita on exports per capita using the estimates of the regression results 
reported in the fourth column of Table 3 (Heckman estimates). 